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IS TITLE IX REALLY TO BLAME FOR THE
DECLINE IN INTERCOLLEGIATE MEN'S
NONREVENUE SPORTS?
DANIEL R. MARBURGER

&
NANCY HOGSHEAD-MAKAR*

I. INTRODUCTION

Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 was enacted to provide
equal educational opportunities for women. Recently, certain men's sports
have experienced sharp declines in the number of teams offered. 1 Wrestling,
in particular, has lost over 170 varsity programs between 1981 and 1999.2
Critics blame Title IX for these cuts to men's teams, 3 arguing that the law
makes it economically impractical with limited budgets for universities to
operate men's non-revenue producing sports while providing for women's
sports.
This paper employs both the economic theory of higher education and the
profit maximization theory of the firm to discount these critics by arguing that
the trend to cut men's sports in Division I-A is driven by profit-motivated
athletic departments, and not tight budgets. Weakening gender equity laws
*
Daniel R. Marburger is professor of economics at Arkansas State University. Nancy
Hogshead-Maker is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Florida Coastal School of Law.
1. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., NO. 01-297, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES'
EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS (2001). Certain women's sports, too, have
experienced similar declines in opportunities. Gymnastics, in particular, has lost over 100 teams
between 1981 and 1999. Id.
2. Id.
3. Ted Curtis, Wrestling with Title IX Compliance and Men's Sports Programs, 13 ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. 1 (1995); Bill Pennington, More Men's Teams Benched as Colleges Level the Field,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at Al ("Since the passage 30 years ago of the law commonly known as
Title IX, more than 170 wrestling programs, 80 men's tennis teams, 70 men's gymnastics teams and
45 men's track teams have been eliminated."); Thomas Stinson, Dying: Men's College Gymnastics
Title IX Victims, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 8, 1995, at F2 ("The 1972 passage of Title IX, improving
opportunities for women, began a downward trend for non-revenue-producing men's teams in many
sports." ); Megan K. Starace, Reverse Discrimination Under Title IX. Do Men Have A Sporting
Chance?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 189 (2001); Charles P. Beveridge, Title IX and Intercollegiate
Athletics: When Schools Cut Men's Athletic Teams, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 809 (1996).
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will only make shifting resources from the minor sports to men's football and
basketball easier.
Large athletic departments are currently using the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) as an agent to procure monopoly revenues while
benefiting from the services of unpaid athletes. 4 As the financial incentive
from lucrative bowl and/or Final Four appearances increases, the incentive to
substitute away from non-revenue sports into men's football and basketball
increases. 5 Division I universities, therefore, have a financial motive to reduce
the number of non-revenue sports toward the minimum required by the
NCAA.
Meanwhile, Division II and III athletic departments, operating on
substantially smaller budgets and without the incentive to operate to maximize
profitability, allocate resources across sports in a manner consistent with the
educational mission of the university, and are not cutting men's sports.
Economic theory would predict that if Title IX had truly placed unreasonable
financial constraints on athletic departments, the evidence suggesting a trend
of dropping men's sports should have been reversed.
Title IX, which was first enacted in 1972 and later strengthened by the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, passed in 1988,6 prohibits educational
institutions that receive federal funds from engaging in sex discrimination. It
says simply, "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 7 The law's prohibition against sex discrimination is very
broad. It applies to every aspect of a federally funded education program or
activity (including athletics), and extends to elementary, high schools,
colleges, and universities. 8 By 1974, the administrative predecessor to the
current Department of Education, the Department of Health Education and
Welfare ("HEW"), promulgated a draft of the implementing regulations,
received comments, and re-promulgated them in 1975. 9 Congress then held

4. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIGTIME COLLEGE SPORTS 101- 114 (1999).

5. Revenues from the Bowl Championship Series totaled over $98 million in 2001-2002. See
at http://www.ncaa.org/membership/postseason-football
Nat'l
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
/BCSrevenue.pdf (Apr. 14, 2003).
6. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988).
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
8. Id. at § 1681(c).
9. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., No. 01-297, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES'
EXPERIENCES ADDING AND DISCONTINUING TEAMS (2001).
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hearings and debated the regulations' fate. 10 Attempts to weaken the
regulations failed, putting the current regulations in effect when President Ford
signed them. The regulations require institutions to provide male and female
students with the following:
1) Equal opportunities to participate in sports;
2) An equitable allocation of scholarships monies; and
3) Equal treatment in all aspects of athletics, including coaching,
facilities, equipment, medical treatment, travel, and support among
other things. '1
The regulations required compliance in elementary schools by 1976, and high
schools, colleges, and universities, to be in compliance by 1978.12
By July 1978, HEW had received "nearly 100 complaints alleging
discrimination in athletics against more than 50 institutions of higher
education."' 13 It became clear to investigators that universities and athletes
needed further guidance on how to comply with Title IX. The central question
became whether a school had provided sufficient sporting opportunities to
play for their female student-athletes. In response, HEW issued a policy
interpretation (the "Policy Interpretation") in 1979 that further clarified the
meaning of Title IX's "equal opportunity" mandate. 14
The Policy Interpretation set forth three wholly independent ways for
schools to demonstrate that students of both genders have equal opportunities
to participate in sports. Institutions can comply by showing either that:
(1) the percentage of male and female athletes is substantially
proportionate to the percentage of male and female students enrolled
in the school, (the so-called "proportionality test") ("Prong 1"); OR
(2) the school has a history and a continuing practice of expanding
opportunities for female students because their gender is usually the
one excluded from sports, ("Prong 2"); OR
(3) the school is fully and effectively meeting its female students'

10. Id.
11. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2003) (Originally published at 45 C.F.R. Part 86, now at 34 C.F.R.
Part 106. See General Athletics Regulation: 34 C.F.R. § 106.41; Athletic Scholarships Regulation: 34
C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
12. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(d).
13. See Title LX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation: Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. I1,1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 86)
[hereinafter Policy Interpretation].
14. Id.
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interests and abilities to participate in sports ("Prong 3").15
If a school meets any one of these tests, it is in compliance with Title IX's
participation requirements. This three-part test has been in effect for more than
two decades and has been upheld by every one of the eight federal appeals
courts that has considered it. 16 The theory is that if a school has not met
demand for sports participation, if it does not have a history of continued
expansion for its women's athletics program, and it is not providing
opportunities proportionately, then it is not fairly dividing these opportunities
17
between men and women.
Schools retain the flexibility to decide how the opportunities they create
are to be allocated among sports or teams, so long as they provide equal
participation opportunities to men and women overall. 18 Cutting men's sports
is a disfavored practice to the extent that the Office for Civil Rights has
control over athletic department decisions -the OCR has already expressly
prohibited schools from demonstrating compliance with either Prong 2 or
Prong 3 by cutting men's sports.19
Advocates for both men's and women's sports agree that opportunities to
participate in sports yield much more than the substantial life-long health
benefits of running around a field or swimming up and down a pool:
participation in sports is an important educational experience. 20 The male
wrestlers express the sentiment well in their motto: "Wrestling -Training for
the Rest of Your Life!-

21

The purpose of Title IX is to make discrimination based on gender in
15. Id.at 71,418.
16. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 1, and accompanying text.
17. See Policy Interpretation, supra note 13, at 71,418.
18. Homer v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 43 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1994); Roberts v. Colo.
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824. 829 (10th Cir. 1993).
19. Letter from the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996) [hereinafter 1996
Clarification Letter].
20. See, e.g., Donna de Varona & Julie Foudy, Minority Views on the Report of the Commission
on Opportunity in Athletics, Feb. 2003, at 3 [hereinafter Minority Report]. The complete text of
Minority Report is included within this publication.
21. See
Ken
Chertow,
Gold
Medal
Wrestling,
available
at
http://www.kenchertow.com/index.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2003). Other slogans from sports
advocates include "Study skills" with a photo of a young girl on the uneven parallel bars, "Career
Move," "Dare to Compete," and "Game for Anything." Nike, Advertisement (television broadcast,
1995). "If you let me play, if you let me play sports, I will like myself more; I will have more selfconfidence. If you let me play sports, if you let me play, I will be sixty percent less likely to get
breast cancer; I will suffer less depression. If you let me play sports, I will be more likely to leave a
man who beats me. If you let me play, I will be less likely to get pregnant before I want to. I will
learn what it means to be strong, if you let me play.").
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education and athletics unlawful. 22 It is not designed to protect sports or any
particular men's or women's sport or team. Title IX does not prevent schools
from abandoning the educational mission of athletics, and it cannot prevent
schools from deciding to drop a men's team 2 3 or indeed, its entire athletic
department. 24 It does not give pretext to schools that make indefensible
decisions. The law is limited to providing both boys and girls, men and
25
women, with educational experiences equitably.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Economists generally assume that individuals seek higher education as a
human capital investment. Human capital refers to the characteristics workers
acquire to make them more productive and, hence, more valuable to firms. In
general, the more valuable they are, the greater the earnings they can
command in the marketplace. Human capital investment can take the form of
job training or schooling. The notion that schooling offers a return on one's
investment was suggested as far back as in 1776, when Adam Smith wrote:
"The work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above
the usual wages of common labour will replace to him the whole expense of
his education, with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable
26
capital."
Support for the theory of human capital appears in the form of ageearnings profiles. U.S. Census data consistently reveals a positive correlation
between age and earnings that tends to peak at around age fifty-five. 27 This
suggests an increase in productivity as workers gain experience. The data also
show that at any age level, persons with a degree in higher education earn
more than individuals with a high school education. 2 8 Moreover, the rate of
29
earnings growth is higher for college graduates.
Human capital is referred to as an "investment," not only because it

22. 34 C.F.R. § 106.1.
23. Homer, 43 F.3d at 275 (citing Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 898-99 (1st Cir. 1993)).
24. See Michael Janofsky, Brooklyn College Drops Sports, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1992 at B13
(Brooklyn College dropped its entire athletics' program in response to a Title IX lawsuit.); T. Jesse
Wilde, Gender Equity in Athletics: Coming of Age in the '90s, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 217, 244-45
(1994).
25. 34 C.F.R.§ 106.31.
26. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 90 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991) (1776).
27. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, MONEY INCOME OF PERSONS AND FAMILIES IN THE UNITED
STATES (2000).

28. Id.
29. Id.
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increases the individual's future earnings, but also because the student
foregoes an opportunity to earn income as a full-time employee during his/her
years of schooling. Moreover, any foregone earnings could have been
invested at the going rate of interest. Consequently, the rate of return to
schooling is treated as the incremental difference between a person's lifetime
30
earnings with and without a college degree discounted to its present value.
Most of the private rate of return has been estimated to be in the neighborhood
31
of 5% to 15%.
Although higher education provides monetary returns on investment, it
also provides nonpecuniary benefits. A college education can steer the
graduate away from tedious or dangerous work into a career with a more
desirable working environment suitable to their tastes. Not only can this
explain the choice to enter college, it can also explain why some entering
college students choose majors that promise a lower return on the investment
relative to other majors.
In addition to increasing worker productivity, higher education may
provide a successful screening function. For employers seeking the most
promising employees, a degree can signal intelligence, drive, and selfdiscipline. Moreover, a firm with positive experiences with graduates from a
given college may look more favorably to future applicants from the same
school. In the absence of these signals, the process of identifying applicants
with desirable traits for the workplace can be tedious and expensive.
Consequently, a completed degree can serve as a low-cost tool for identifying
the most promising pool of applicants.
Various nonacademic elements within the university can also assist the
screening function. Leadership in student organizations and participation in
intercollegiate athletics can also signal the values sought by firms.
One might wonder whether higher education is necessary; after all, a
worker could, as a substitute for education, become more productive through
on-the-job training. 3 2 The critical element in this discussion lies in the
distinction between general training and firm-specific training. When a firm
hires an intern or apprentice, it accepts the notion that the individual's
productivity is unlikely to justify its costs during the training period. The
investment, however, should pay off due to the increased productivity of the

30. Giora Hanoch, An Economic Analysis of Earnings and Schooling, 2 J. HUM. RESOURCES
310, 321 (1967).
31. See George Psacharopoulos, Returns to Education: A Further International Update and
Implications, 20 J. HUM. RESOURCES 583, 585 (1985).
32. See Laurie J. Bassi, Estimating the Effect of Training Programswith Non-Random Selection,
66 REv. ECON. & STAT. 36, 42 (1984).
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worker in the post-training period. If competing firms value the skills
acquired during training, the current employer will have to increase its wage
Assuming the higher wage
offer to retain the employee's services.
incorporates the full value of the increased productivity of the worker, the
training firm will never recover its investment during the training period.
In contrast, if the skills acquired during training are specific to the firm,
then the worker's increased productivity will not have to be met with higher
wages, allowing the firm to recover its training investment. Collectively, this
suggests that firms will be unwilling to pay for general training (such as the
skills and generalized knowledge acquired through a college education), but
will be willing to pay for firm-specific training. The individual seeking higher
wages will, therefore, pay for general training.
Studies have demonstrated rather conclusively that students' choices
regarding higher education are sensitive to its costs and benefits. 33 The human
capital models provide an explanation for many commonly observed trends.
First, investments in higher education typically occur at younger ages. The
younger an individual invests in human capital, the longer he/she can reap its
benefits. Similarly, because a college education entails foregone earnings, the
opportunity cost of attending college is lower for a younger and otherwise
lower-paid employee. Second, the human capital theory is consistent with the
shape of the age-earnings profile. College-educated workers earn more money
at any age than non-college educated employees, although the gap diminishes
with age.
Human capital investment theory can also explain trends in women's
participation in higher education. The number of women seeking a college
34
education has increased dramatically over the past several decades,
undoubtedly coinciding with rising career opportunities. Between 1970 and
1999, for example, the number of women enrolled in institutions of higher
35
learning increased by 235%, as compared to an increase of 129% for men.
Beyond serving as a human capital investment, individuals may view a
college education as a "consumption good." The lifestyle of a college student
may be viewed as an enjoyable experience. In this regard, the college
experience provides an opportunity to join student organizations, participate in
or serve as a spectator to athletic events, or simply to make new friends.

33. Christopher Pissarides, From School to University: The Demand for Post-Compulsory
Education in Britain, 92 ECON. J. 654-667 (1982); Robert Willis & Sherwin Rosen, Education and
Self-Selection, 87 J. POL. ECON. 57 (1979).
34.

U.S. NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS,

Table 172 (2002).
35. Id.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

III. THE EFFICIENT PROVISION OF AN EDUCATION
A critical difference distinguishes higher education from primary and
secondary education. Primary and secondary education are compulsory. In
contrast, investment in higher education is a personal choice. This creates a
burden on the university to not only induce the individual to invest in a college
education, but to enroll in that particular institution. 36 In attracting students,
therefore,
a college
must
devote
its
resources
to suit the
37
market.
its
of
needs
investment/consumption
Despite the fact that most colleges and universities are tax-exempt
organizations, institutions of higher learning behave as firms because they
must attract consumers. Assuming the students' choice of which college to
attend is motivated by an interest in both investment and consumption
opportunities, a university must allocate its budget in such a way as to provide
a package of benefits that further these needs at a competitive price.
To better understand this process, we can retreat to the theory of the firm.
Because a firm's resources are fixed in supply, profit-maximization requires
the firm to allocate its scarce resources in the most efficient manner. Suppose,
for example, that a firm produces two goods, A and B. Because a worker
cannot simultaneously produce both products, the manager must allocate its
labor between goods A and B in such a way as to maximize profit. Given that
the worker's hourly wage is the same regardless of which product he/she
produces, assigning the worker to the good for which his/her efforts generate
the most profit will maximize overall firm profits. Put another way, if
switching a worker from good A to good B will cause B's profits to increase
by a greater amount than A's profits decrease, the firm's overall profits will
rise.
If reallocating resources away from good A into good B invariably caused
the firm's overall profits to rise, the firm would maximize its profits by
transferring all of its resources into the production of good B (and ceasing to
produce good A altogether). For the multiproduct firm, this is rarely the
optimal strategy due to the laws of diminishing marginal utility and the law of
36. At the primary/secondary level, one could argue that a similar burden exists for private
schools.
37. Although this paper concentrates on an individual's decision to enter college based on the
costs and benefits to that person, some argue that a college education generates "positive
externalities" or benefits to third parties. For example, a better-informed society makes for better
government. This would justify state or federal subsidies and a not-for-profit tax status.
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diminishing marginal returns in production. The law of diminishing marginal
utility refers to the value consumers place on various goods and services. If
society preferred good B to good A, it would be willing to pay more to get it.
Assuming production costs are the same, all resources would be allocated to
the production of B because it promised greater profits. The law of
diminishing marginal utility asserts, however, that the added satisfaction
consumers receive from consuming additional units gradually decreases.
The existence of the "law" can be inferred from a simple example.
Suppose an individual attended a football game with $1.00, which could either
be spent on a hot dog or a soft drink (which are both priced at $1.00). Since
the prices of the goods are identical, the person would clearly choose the
product that gave him/her the most satisfaction. Suppose in this case, he/she
opted for the hot dog. If the person had a second dollar to spend, he/she would
have to choose between a second hot dog and the first soft drink. If the person
purchases a second hot dog, we can conclude that the second hot dog provided
more satisfaction than the first soft drink. If the individual chose the soft
drink, the reverse must be true. Note the inferred set of preferences should the
buyer select the soft drink. We already know that the first hot dog was
preferred to the first soft drink. We now observe that the first soft drink was
preferred to the second hot dog. Logically, therefore, we can also infer that the
first hot dog must be preferred to the second hot dog. This is the law of
diminishing marginal utility. If it were not valid, the buyer would spend all of
his/her money on hot dogs. The mere fact that consumers spend their money
on varieties of goods and services serves as implicit proof of the validity of the
law.
The law of diminishing returns in production refers to the notion that as
resources are added to the production of a good, each additional resource
causes production to rise by progressively smaller amounts. As an analogy,
consider a single person trying to move a heavy piece of furniture up a flight
of stairs. If another individual offered to help, the two persons, each carrying
an opposite end, would be able to carry the furniture up the stairs in a fraction
of the time. If a third person offered to help, the process would probably go
even faster. However, it is unlikely that the third person's contribution made
as much of a difference as the second person. If the workers were not
volunteers, but rather, employees who must be paid a market wage, the third
worker, whose contribution is smaller than the second worker, would generate
less profit as well.
If we use this analogy to generalize about production, we know that a
profit-maximizing firm will reassign a worker to the production of B if it
increases B's profits by a greater amount than it reduces A's profits.
However, due to the laws of diminishing marginal utility, each additional unit
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of B produced is valued less and less by consumers. Consequently, the
marginal benefit of producing additional units of B decreases. Moreover, as
workers are reassigned from A to B, the law of diminishing marginal returns
asserts that each additional worker will cause B's production (and hence,
profit) to rise by increasingly smaller increments. Together, the laws of
diminishing marginal utility and returns to production suggest that the
marginal profit to the firm from reallocating resources from A to B will get
progressively smaller. 3 8 Eventually, the firm will reach the point beyond
which additional reallocations of resources will cause B's profits to rise by
less than the amount for which A's profits fall. Note the implications: A
firm's overall profits will rise by reallocating resources from A to B as long as
the marginal profit to B exceeds the marginal (lost) profit to A. Once the
marginal profits to each good are identical, any additional reallocation to B
will cause the firm's overall profits to decrease. In other words, the firm's
profits are maximized by allocatingresources until the marginalprofit of each
good is identical.
The noncompulsory nature of higher education forces the institution to
behave in a manner similar to the firm. Because students can choose from a
variety of colleges, each institution must provide a desirable package at a
competitive price to attract applicants. Because higher education services are
seen by prospective consumers as both a source of human capital investment
and as a consumption good, each college must allocate its resources to achieve
maximum benefit. Owing to its desire to attract students, we can easily apply
the theory of the firm. If we were to focus on college as a human capital
investment, the school would normally choose to allocate all of its resources to
the major that promises the greatest post-graduation earnings. However, the
law of diminishing marginal utility suggests that additional expenditures on,
say, the business major will eventually do less to attract students than applying
the resources to other majors. Similarly, as the law of diminishing marginal
returns to production applies, additional expenditures on one major will do
less to increase the students' post-graduation earnings than dedicating the
funds to other majors.
Consequently, the implications for the profitmaximizing firm apply to the institution of higher learning: scarce resources
will be allocated until the marginal benefit on the last dollar spent on each
program is the same for each program. Recalling that higher education can
serve as both an investment and a consumption good, the "marginal benefit"
reflects both elements of consumer demand.

38. If one follows the logic of diminishing marginal utility and returns to production, he/she
should also see that by reassigning resources from A to B, the foregone profits from each unit of A
get progressively larger.
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Robert Simon reflected on the role of athletics at a university. 39 The
consequentialist function of athletics refers to the benefits that sports
participation confers upon the student-athlete. 40 According to this argument,
athletics is consistent with the mission of a university because it develops
41
desirable traits "such as courage, integrity and coolness under pressure."
Clearly, developing these traits is consistent with the view of college as a
human capital investment.
42
Simon also posed an alternative view of intercollegiate athletics.
According to the utilitarian perspective, college athletics garner local and/or
national support for the university, generate revenue to support the university
mission, and create a sense of community among students, faculty, and
alumni. 43 Note that the utilitarian focus is not just on the benefits of athletics
to student-athletes but to the entire university community. 44 From this
viewpoint, intercollegiate athletics are promoted as spectator sports,
contributing to the "consumption good" component of the university
45
"product.
In evaluating the consequentialist and utilitarian perspectives, we should
first note that they are not mutually exclusive. Clearly, the consequentialist
benefits can be enjoyed at any NCAA divisional level. Similarly, regardless
of whether tickets are sold to athletic contests, members of the university
community are free to consume any of these events as spectators. The key is
the relative mix of consequentialist/utilitarian emphasis in the program.
IV. NCAA DIVISIONAL MEMBERSHIP AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES

The NCAA is made up of three divisions: Division I, Division II, and
Division III. According to the Division III philosophy, members "place
special importance on the impact of athletics on the participants rather than on
the spectators and place greater emphasis on the internal constituency
(students, alumni, institutional personnel) than on the general public and its
entertainment needs." 4 6 Each member school must field at least five men's
39. Robert Simon, Intercollegiate Athletics: Do They Belong on Campus?, in SPORTS AND
SOCIAL VALUES 126 (1985), reprinted in RETHINKING COLLEGE ATHLETICS 43 (Judith Andre &
David N. James eds., 1991).
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.at 47.
Id.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Simon, supra note 39, at 57.

45. Id.
46. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I11MANUAL Art. 20.11
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and five women's sports. 47 As a rule, Division III schools do not give athletic
48
scholarships.
Similar to Division III, the Division II philosophy states its belief that "a
well-conducted intercollegiate athletics program, based on sound educational
principles and practices, is a proper part of the educational mission of a
university or college and that the educational welfare of the participating
student-athlete is of primary concern." 4 9 However, unlike Division III,
Division II schools believe "in offering opportunity for participation in
intercollegiate athletics by awarding athletic-related financial aid to its
student-athletes." 50 Further, the membership believes that "funds supporting
athletics should be controlled by the institution and that the emphasis for an
athletics department should be to operate within an institutionally approved
budget. ' 51 Division II members must sponsor at least five men's and five
52
women's sports (or four men's and six women's sports).
In sharp contrast to the philosophies of Divisions II and III, the Division I
philosophy "recognizes the dual objective in its athletics program of serving
both the university or college community (participants, student body, facultystaff, alumni) and the general public (community, area, state, nation). '53 More
specifically emphasizing football and basketball, Division I "sponsors at the
highest feasible level of intercollegiate competition one or both of the
traditional spectator-oriented, income-producing sports of football and
basketball."'54 Further, Division I membership "strives to finance its athletics
' '55
program insofar as possible from revenues generated by the program itself"
Division I schools must sponsor a minimum of seven men's and seven
56
women's sports or six men's and eight women's sports.
Division I football programs are separated into two groups: Division I-A,

[hereinafter Division 111 Manual].
47. Id.at Art. 20.11.3(a)-(b).
48. Id. at Art. 20.11.4.
49. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION II MANUAL Art. 20.10
[hereinafter Division II Manual].
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id at Art. 20.10.3(a)-(b).
53. NCAA MEMBERSHIP SERVS. STAFF, 2003-04 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL Art. 20.9
[hereinafter Division I Manual]
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.at Art. 20.9.3(a)-(b). Division I-A schools must sponsor at least 16 sports, effective 2004.
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Division I-AA. 5 7 Effective in 2004, Division I-A schools must average at
least 15,000 in attendance per home football game. 58 In addition, the football
program must offer at least 90% of the permissible maximum number of
scholarships and offer at least 200 athletic scholarships overall or at least $4
million in scholarship expenses. 59 A third Division I category, Division IAAA, meets the Division I criteria, but does not sponsor football.
In inferring the relative emphasis on the consequentialist/utilitarian
perspectives, Division I overtly favors promoting intercollegiate athletics as
spectator sports, with the income potential of football and basketball
specifically identified in its statement of philosophy. 60 In emphasizing the
spectator-orientation of sports, the philosophy specifically notes the goal of a
self-financing athletic department. 6' Division II and III members, in contrast,
explicitly assert that the primary goal of their athletic programs is to benefit
62
the student-athletes.
An examination of the self-reported finances of the corresponding
divisions bears out the differences in philosophy. Table 1 reveals the
percentage of teams in each NCAA division with profitable athletic
departments in 2001.63 Thirty-five percent of the reporting Division I-A
schools reported their athletic programs were profitable (after institutional
support was excluded). In sharp contrast, only 14 (or 5.6%) of the 249
reporting Division II schools reported their athletic programs were
64
profitable.

57. Id. at Art. 20.9. All of the other sports sponsored by Division I-A, I-AA, and I-AAA schools
are simply classified as "Division I."
58. Division1I Manual,supra note 49, at Art. 20.9.6.3.
59. Id. at Art. 20.9.6.4(a)-(b).
60. Id. at Art. 20.9.
61. Id.
62. Id. at Art. 20.10; Division III Manual, supra note 46, at Art. 20.11.
63. The financial performance of Division III athletic departments is not included in the tables
because the NCAA's Revenues and Expenditure of Division III Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
(2002) report shows that none of the Division III sports generate sufficient revenue (absent
institutional support) to pay its expenses.
64. Daniel L. Fulks, Revenues and Expenses of Division III IntercollegiateAthletics Programs:
Financial Trends and Relationships-2001 (2002) at http://www.NCAA.org/library/research/iii-rev
_exp/2002/d3_revenue expenses.pdf (last visited November 17, 2003).
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TABLE 1

Number and PercentageofNCAA Athletic Departmentswith Revenues
Exceeding Expenses by Division, 1993-2001 65
Division I-A

Division
I-AA

Division
I-AAA

Division II
With football

Division II
Without
football

No.

%

5%

7

6%

6%

4

4%

9

7%

10

11%

18%

NA

NA

6

11%

17%

6

9%

3

7%

Year

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

2001

40

35%

9

8%

6

7%

7

1999

48

46%

13

14%

4

5%

8

1997

43

43%

8

9%

7

10%

1995

41

46%

9

13%

8

1993

43

51%

11

15%

8

The financial status of the entire athletic department can potentially cloud
the profitability of football and basketball.
For the department to be
profitable, the profits from "revenue" sports must not only subsidize the losses
from the "nonrevenue" sports, but also the expenses of the infrastructure of the
athletic department (i.e. the athletic director's salary and the salaries of his
staff). With this in mind, it should not be altogether surprising to see that few
athletic departments are actually self-supporting.
Table 2 reveals the 2001 profitability of football, men's basketball, and
women's basketball, respectively, by NCAA Division. As one can see,
football and men's basketball are overwhelmingly profitable at most Division
I-A schools. The average football and men's basketball profit at the I-A level
was $7.4 million and $2.7 million, respectively.
The percentage of profitable football/men's basketball programs at the IAA and I-AAA levels is substantially less than at I-A, with 19% of I-AA
teams generating football profits, and 25% and 35% of basketball programs
showing profits at the I-AA and I-AAA levels, respectively. The level of
profit is also significantly lower than at I-A. For I-AA teams showing profits,

65. NCAA Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
(2002), at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/i_ii_rev-exp/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
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the average profit was $280,000.00 in football and $430,000.00 in men's
basketball. The average profit for the I-AAA profitable basketball teams was
$390,000.00.
Although the percentage of Division II schools with profitable football or
basketball programs is somewhat commensurate with Divisions I-AA and IAAA, the level of profit is substantially less. The twenty-one Division II
schools with profitable football teams averaged $63,000 in profits. Men's
basketball profits averaged $34,000.00 and $22,000.00 for Division II schools
with and without football programs, respectively.
Although women's basketball is the most significant women's sport in
terms of revenue at most schools, it rarely generates sufficient revenues to
cover its costs, even at the Division I-A level. Only six I-A schools supported
profitable women's basketball teams, with an average profit of $510,000.00.
Although the percentage of women's teams with profits is higher at other
divisional levels, the average profit is significantly lower. The profitable I-AA
women's basketball teams averaged $180,000.00 in profits. The average
profit for women's basketball at I-AAA was only $40,000.00. Finally, at the
Division II level, the average women's basketball profit was $22,000.00 and
$13,000.00 for schools with and without football programs, respectively.
Aside from football and basketball, the remaining men's sports are invariably
unprofitable. In 2001, for instance, only ice hockey showed an average profit
66
at the Division I-A, I-AA and Division II (with football) levels.
Similarly, although women's basketball loses money at the majority of
universities, it is the only women's sport with a realistic hope of generating a
profit. In 2001, only synchronized swimming (at the I-AA level), and fencing,
ice hockey, lacrosse, rowing, and water polo (at the Division II without
67
football level) showed small profits.

66. Id. Water polo exhibited small profits at the Division I-AA and Division 11(without football)
levels. Id. Rowing and skiing also reported small profits at the Division 1I (with football) level. Id.
67. Id. With the exception of rowing (10 schools), the number of colleges sponsoring these sports
is less than five. Id.
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2

Number and Percentageof Football,Men's Basketball, and Women's
Basketball Teams with Revenues Exceeding Expenses by Division, 2001
68
(profitsin thousands of dollars)
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I-AA

Division I-A

00

Division
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How do the varying philosophies of the NCAA divisions affect the
resource allocation incentives of the corresponding athletic departments? We

68. NCAA Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
(2002), at htp/wwna~r/irr/eerhii~e
ep(last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
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can begin with Division IlI. As noted in its philosophy statement, Division III
athletic departments emphasize sport to benefit student-athletes rather than
spectators. 69 Because the Division III athletic departments enter into each
fiscal year knowing their teams are a net financial cost to the university, the
institution must weigh the marginal value of athletics as both an investment
and a consumption good against the marginal benefits of other academic and
nonacademic programs. Within the athletic department, the incentives are
much the same. Each sport is viewed as an asset to its human capital
investment/consumption good mission-no sport is perceived as a potential
source of profit. For this reason, we would expect athletic directors to allocate
money in such a way that the marginal benefit per last dollar spent is the same
across all sports.
At the opposite extreme, Division I expressly advertises football and
men's basketball as spectator-oriented, income-producing sports:70 a
philosophy supported by NCAA data. 7 1 This places the athletic director in a
dual role of allocating money toward potentially profitable sports as well as a
dozen or so "nonrevenue" sports. Most economists routinely assume Division
I athletic directors act as profit-maximizers. 72 In fact, the NCAA has been
repeatedly criticized by economists for acting as an economic cartel that seeks
to maximize profits for its members by wielding monopoly power in the
product market (i.e. acting as college football's sole agent for negotiating
television broadcast contracts until the 1980s) and monopsony power in the
labor market (by barring and enforcing a prohibition on payment to student73
athletes).
In contrast, Leeds and von Allmen suggest that athletic director behavior
conforms to the bureaucrat who attempts to deliver a product in return for an
increased budget. 74
Ultimately, the distinctions between the "profitmaximizer" and the "budget-maximizer" become blurred in predicting the
behavior of athletic directors. Similar to the Division III athletic department,
efficient resource allocation at the Division I level requires that the marginal
benefit of the last dollar spent on each sport be equal. Because football and
men's basketball are seen as income-generating sports at the Division I level,
69. Division III Manual, supra note 46, at Art. 20.11.
70. Division I Manual, supra note 53, at Art. 20.9
71. See Table 2, supra.
72. Rodney Fort & James Quirk, The College Football Industry, in SPORTS ECONOMICS:
CURRENT RESEARCH (John Fizel, et al eds., 1999).
73. James Koch, Intercollegiate Athletics: An Economic Explanation, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 360
(1983); ZIMBALIST, supra note 4; ARTHUR FLEISCHER, III ET AL., THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE
ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION: A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR (1992).
74.

MICHAEL LEEDS, & PETER VON ALLMEN, THE ECONOMICS OF SPORTS (1992).
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however, the "marginal benefit" of a dollar spent on football and basketball
exceeds the "marginal benefit" of the same sports at the student-athleteoriented Division III schools. As a result, athletic directors at the Division I
level have an economic incentive to pour greater resources into the "revenue"
sports relative to "nonrevenue" sports than do Division III athletic
75
departments.
This theory is strongly supported by NCAA data, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3 compiles the expenditures on football and basketball at each division
level and divides them by the number of participants in the corresponding
sports. Beginning with Division III, the average per football player was
$1,940.00.
The average expenditure per male basketball player was
$3,391.00, as compared to an average expenditure of $3,220.00 per female
basketball player. For the remaining men's (nonrevenue) sports, the average
expenditure per athlete was $1,487.00, as compared to $1,382.00 per woman
(nonbasketball) athlete. In other words, for each $1.00 spent on a male
nonrevenue sport participant, $1.55 was spent on a football/men's basketball
player. Similarly, for each dollar spent on a female nonrevenue sport
participant, $1.07 was spent on a male nonrevenue sport participant.

75. See Koch, supra note 73 (suggesting that the relatively high number of nonrevenue sports
required at the Division I level serves as an effective market barrier to protect the lucrative television
broadcast revenues).
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TABLE

3

Expenditureper Participantby Division, 2001 76

Division I

Division 11

Division III

EXPENDITURE

EXPENDITURE

EXPENDITURE

Sport

PER
PARTICIPANT

PER
PARTICIPANT

PER
PARTICIPANT

FOOTBALL

$38,895
$78,486

$5,641
$13,378

$1,940

MEN'S BASKETBALL
FOOTBALL/MEN'S
BAKTBALLMNED

$42,205

$7,529

$2,308

MEN'S NONREVENUE

$8,442

$3,432

$1,487

WOMEN'S BASKETBALL

$51,627

$12,672

$3,220

WOMEN'S NONREVENUE

$10,661

$4,198

$1,382

BASKETBALL COMBINED

$3,391

As we progress toward Division I, the expenditures are becoming
increasing stilted toward football and men's basketball.
The average
expenditure per football player at the Division II level was $5,641.00. The
average expenditure per male basketball player was $13,378.00, as compared
to the $12,672.00 expenditure per female basketball player. For the remaining
sports, the average expenditure was $3,432.00 per male athlete and $4,198.00
per female athlete. Overall, for each dollar spent on a men's nonrevenue
athlete, $2.19 was spent on a football/men's basketball player. Similarly, for
each dollar spent on a female nonrevenue sport athlete, $.81 was spent on a
men's nonrevenue sport athlete.
At the Division I level, as Table 3 also shows, the budget allocation
between income/non-income producing sports becomes even more uneven.
The average expenditure per Division I football player was $38,895.00. The
76. See NCAA Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and 1I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
(2002), at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/i ii-rev-exp/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2003); NCAA
Revenues and Expenses of Division III Intercollegiate Athletics Programs (2002), at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/iiirev-exp/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2003); National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 1982-2002 NCAA Sponsorship and ParticipationRate Report (2003), available at

http://www.ncaa.comibrary/research/participation-rates/1982-2002/participation.pdf
Oct. 27, 2003).

(last

visited
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average expenditure per male basketball player was $78,486.00, as compared
to $51,627.00 per woman basketball player. An average of $8,442.00 was
spent per men's nonrevenue sport participant. In comparison, an average of
$10,661.00 was spent per female nonrevenue sport participant. Collectively,
for each dollar spent on a male nonrevenue sport participant, $5.00 was spent
on each football/men's basketball player. For each dollar spent on a female
nonrevenue sport athlete, $.79 was spent on a male nonrevenue participant.
Note that at the Division III level, football and men's basketball receive
only a mild budgetary preference relative to other sports. Commensurate with
theory, this suggests that these sports (and perhaps women's basketball as
well) serve as "consumption goods" for non-student athletes. In other words,
although football or men's basketball have no realistic potential for profits,
they are most likely to attract students as spectators and, hence, complement
the students' nonacademic consumption-oriented experiences. For the sports
that are least likely to attract students as spectators, the budget allocation
across men and women's sports are almost identical.
Although the Division II philosophy emphasizes the student-athlete, the
potential for profitable football or basketball programs rises. Not surprisingly,
we begin to see a greater allocation of resources toward these sports than was
evidenced at the Division III level. More than twice as much money was spent
on each football/men's basketball player than on each nonrevenue male
athlete. In contrast to the Division III level, women nonrevenue sport athletes
receive greater expenditures per participant than do male nonrevenue sport
athletes.
At the Division I level, the budget shifts dramatically to favor football and
Here, five times as much money is spent on a
men's basketball.
football/men's basketball player compared to a men's nonrevenue sport
athlete. In comparing the budget allocation between men's and women's
sports, the data reveal that for each dollar spent on a woman basketball player,
$1.52 was spent on a male basketball player. This compares with the $1.05
per dollar split at both the Division II and III levels. Once football and
men's/women's basketball are removed, women receive a mild preference in
the budget allocation process. For each dollar spent on a woman nonrevenue
sport athlete, a male nonrevenue sport participant receives $.79.
Complicating the budget allocation process for Division I athletic directors
is the "arms race." The "arms race" is better known among economists as the
"prisoner's dilemma." 77 When Saturday afternoon approaches, exactly 50%
77. The "Prisoner's Dilemma" was originally theorized by mathematician Albert W. Tucker in
1950 while he was a visiting professor at Stanford University. See Albert W. Tucker, 4 Two-Person
Dilemma, in READINGS IN GAMES AND INFORMATION (Eric Rasmussen ed., 2001).
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of the football teams will emerge as winners. Athletic directors, whose
budgets and job security is likely to be tied to the success of the higher profile
sports, have an incentive to be among the winning 50%. Although paying
athletes is prohibited by the NCAA, athletic departments can seek to "tip the
scales" by spending more money on recruiting, a larger coaching staff, a
higher quality (and, therefore, more expensive) coach, or by investing in stateof-the-art facilities and/or equipment as a means to attract choice recruits. 78 In
short, a department can increase its chances of fielding a winning team by
spending more money. For the profit-maximizing athletic director, the
incentive to increase spending in an effort to win more games also makes
sense as long as the expected increase in revenues from ticket sales and
broadcast revenues exceeds the added cost.
However, since winning is a zero-sum game, any additional games won by
one team implies an increase in the number of games lost by other teams.
Because an opposing athletic department's increasing spending jeopardizes
another athletic director's budget/job security/revenue base, the self-interested
athletic director must match the spending increase to maintain the status quo.
Note that both teams wind up spending more money on their teams, but the
percentage of teams that win on Saturday is still mathematically fixed at 50%.
Figure 1 constructs a matrix with hypothetical data to convey the
prisoner's dilemma assuming a two-team league. 79 The number on the left
side of each cell represents the percentage of games team X can be expected to
win given the corresponding expenditures for teams X and Y. Similarly, the
number on the right side within each cell represents the percentage of games
team Y will win under the same pair of expenditures. For example, if each
team continues to spend $5 million/year on its football team, both teams X and
Y will win 50% of their games. If team X increases its expenditures to $6
million, it can expect to win 75% of its game. This also implies that team Y
will win only 25% of its games. The reverse is true if team Y increases its
expenditures to $6 million while X's spending remains constant at $5 million.
Finally, it both teams increase their spending to $6 million, each team can
expect to win 50% of its games.

78. In fact, illegal payments to athletes have plagued intercollegiate athletics since its earliest
days. See WALTER BYERS, UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT (1995).
79. A "two-team" league is unrealistic, but it allows for a two-dimensional graphical analysis.
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FIGURE 1
Team Y
Spend $5 million
Spend $5 million
Team X
50%, 50%

Spend $6 million
25%, 75%

Spend $6 million
50%, 50%
75%, 25%

According to the matrix, if Y continues to spend $5 million, X will choose
to spend $6 million because doing so will increase the percentage of games
won from 50% to 75%. On the other hand, if Y decides to spend $6 million, X
is compelled to match the spending increase to keep the expected percentage
of wins at 50%. In other words, regardless of what Y does, X has an incentive
to increase spending to $6 million. 80 Note that Y's scenarios echo that of X.
Consequently, regardless of X's actions, Y also has an incentive to spend $6
million. We can, therefore, assert that both teams will opt to spend $6 million
rather than $5 million. 8 1 The prisoner's dilemma is described by the following
result: both teams wind up increasing spending, yet the expected number of
82
wins is the same as if neither team had increased spending.
NCAA data on program expenditures illustrate the arms race. As Table 4
indicates, the average expenditure for a I-A football team increased by $2.135
million between 1993 and 2001. In coniast, football expenditures increased
by an average of $320,000.00 and $180,000.00 per Division I-AA and
Division II member, respectively, during this time frame. Similarly, the
expenditures for men's basketball at the I-A level rose by an average of
$880,000.00 from 1993-2001, as compared with increases of $260,000.00 and
$310,000.00, respectively, at Divisions I-AA and I-AAA. Men's basketball
80. This analysis is derived from game theory. The notion that X has an incentive to spend $6
million regardless of Y's action is called a dominant strategy.
81. In game theory, this is referred to as a Nash equilibrium, following the implications derived
mathematically by Nobel Prize winner John Nash.
82. Critics of the NCAA assert that the association acts as a cartel. See sources cited supra note
73. One of its functions is to bar payments to athletes (which is the Nash equilibrium) and increase its
members' profits in doing so. Id.
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expenses increased by $70,000.00 for Division 1I schools with football
programs and by $220,000.00 for Division II schools without football.
Women's basketball, which has the most revenue-generating power among the
women's sports, witnessed spending increases of $660,000.00 at the I-A level
($220,000.00 less than the spending increase on men's basketball), and
increases of $280,000.00 and $350,000.00 at levels I-AA and I-AAA,
respectively. At the Division II level, women's basketball expenses rose by an
average of $90,000.00 per school.
In contrast to the revenue sports, the increased spending on the average
nonrevenue sport is substantially lower. At the I-A level, the average men's
nonrevenue sport saw an increase of $148,000.00 over the same time frame.
For women, the average nonrevenue sport experienced an increase of
$204,000.00. At the I-AA and I-AAA levels, the average men's and women's
nonrevenue sport expenditures rose by $73,000.00 and $85,000.00,
respectively. For Division II schools housing football programs, the average
men's nonrevenue sport evidenced an increase of $34,000 as compared to
$30,000 for women. Finally, the increased expenditure for the average men's
and women's nonrevenue sport at the Division II (without football) level was
$34,000 and $52,000, respectively.
TABLE 4

Average Expendituresby Sport by Division, 1993-2001 (in thousands of
dollars)83

AVG. EXPENDITURES

Division
I-AAA

Division II

Division II

with
football

without
football

Division
I-A

Division
I-AA

2001

$6165

$1310

$550

1999
1997
1995

$5260
$4430
$4100

$480
$430
$390

1993

$4030

$1100
$1060
$1020
$990

Sport
FOOTBALL

$370

83. NCAA Revenues and Expenses of Divisions I and II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
(2002), at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/i-ii-rev exp/(last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
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$2135

$320

2001

$1970

$740

$900

$230

$430

1999
1997

$1580
$1300

$640
$580

$810
$640

$210
$190

$390
$340

1995
1993
CHANGE 1993-

$1220
$1090

$560
$480

$650
$590

$160
$160

$240
$210

$880

$260

$310

$70

$220

$180

MEN'S
BASKETBALL

2001
MEN'S
(AVG. PER SPORT)

NONREVENUE

2001
1999

$324
$244

$144
$109

$169
$147

$78
$68

$86
$78

1997
1995
1993

$297
$186
$176

$140
$100
$71

$135
$99
$79

$67
$54
$44

$85
$60
$52

CHANGE
2001 1993-

$148

$73

$90

$34

$34

2001

$1100

$540

$640

$210

1999
1997
1995
1993

$910
$700
$550
$440

$460
$390
$320
$260

$540
$420
$340
$290

$180
$150
$130
$120

$190
$160
$150
$120
$100

CHANGE
2001 19932001

$660

$280

$350

$90

$90

2001
WOMEN'S
BASKETBALL

WOMEN'S
(AVG. PER SPORT)

NONREVENUE

2001
1999
1997
1995

$358

$154

$181

$64

$84

$277
$303
$218

$151
$130
$86

$62
$54
$44

1993

$154

$117
$140
$93
$69

$60

$34

$70
$70
$50
$32

CHANGE 1993-

$204

$85

$121

$30

$52

2001
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The scenario becomes even more problematic if the revenue potentials of
the teams vary. If X is a revenue-rich team, it will always benefit by
outspending Y. But as Y's expenses are driven upward by the "arms race," it
feels increasingly compelled to match spending increases, or its revenues will
suffer as its number of games won tumbles. The result is an "arms race"
through which the rich get richer and the poor get poorer.
This "arms race" is illustrated in Table 5. The table shows both the
average profit and average loss at each division level for football and men's
basketball programs between 1993 and 2001. As the table indicates, the
average profit for football and basketball programs at the Division I-A level
has nearly doubled since 1993. At the same time, however, size of the average
loss at the I-A level increased by $300,000.00 in football and $140,000.00 in
basketball. At the I-AA level, the average football profit increased from
$80,000 to $280,000.00 from 1993-2001, but the average football loss rose
from $660,000.00 to $780,000.00 during the same time frame. The average
basketball profit/loss did not change much at the I-AA level, whereas the
average profit actually decreased at the I-AAA level. 84 Note that these trends
do not exist at the Division II level, where the average profits and losses have
not changed significantly during this time frame. 85 In sum, the arms race
appears to be at its most insidious at the Division I (and especially I-A) level.

84. One should note that some perennial basketball powerhouse schools such as Georgetown,
Villanova, and St. John's moved from I-AAA to 1-AA during this time frame.
85. Average profit figures have fluctuated significantly from year to year. This is undoubtedly a
function of the small number of teams that profit at the Division II level in any given year.
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TABLE 5

Average Size of Profit/Loss by Sport by Division, 1993-2001 (in thousands of
dollars)86

Division I-A

Division

Division

Division II

I-AA

I-AAA

with football

Division II
without
football

FOOTBALL
2001

$7400

$1300

$280

$780

$63

$314

1999

$6400

$1000

$290

$630

$52

$300

1997

$5000

$1100

$300

$660

$92

$274

1995

$3900

$1000

$350

$630

$64

$302

1993

$3900

$1000

$80

$660

$144

$289

MEN'S BASKETBALL
2001

$2710

$370

$430

$300

$390

$340

$34

$123

$22

$136

1999

$2330

$290

$510

$260

$430

$290

$30

$130

$40

$144

1997

$2200

$290

$590

$250

$390

$280

$52

$125

$21

$135

1995

$1940

$230

$560

$250

$240

$320

$28

$114

$39

$127

1993

$1640

$230

$450

$240

$500

$300

$65

$134

$33

$129

V.

TITLE

IX: A

CASE OF MISPLACED BLAME?

A target of considerable controversy since its inception, Title IX has
undergone its most recent attack on behalf of the National Wrestling Coaches'
Association. Critics of the legislation assert that Title IX's proportionality
component has forced schools to eliminate some of the men's nonrevenue
sports. 87 At face value, the implicit cause-and-effect seems logical. Only

86. NCAA Revenues and Expenses of Division I and II Intercollegiate Athletics Programs
(2002), at http://www.ncaa.org/library/research/i-ii-rev-exp/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2003).
87. See sources cited, supra note 3.
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women's basketball has any real chance of generating profits for the athletic
program; consequently, women's sports must be viewed as a financial drain on
scarce athletic budget resources. Facing a need to allocate the budget in such a
way as to satisfy Title IX proportionality, the athletic director has little
alternative but to cut some men's nonrevenue sports.
Compelling as the argument may be, the facts speak otherwise. If Title IX
requirements placed an undue burden on athletic budgets, one would expect to
see the axe fall disproportionately on Division III men's nonrevenue sports,
since neither football nor men's basketball can be counted on to generate
profits to help foot the bill. In contrast, football and men's basketball are often
profitable (overwhelmingly so at the Division I-A level). 88 Therefore, we
would expect the profits from these sports to effectively cross-subsidize the
men's nonrevenue sports, sparing it from the "deleterious" effects of Title IX.
Curiously, the reverse is true. Table 6 shows data compiled by the
Women's Sports Foundation on the number of men's sports added and
eliminated between 1978 and 1996. The data shows that at the Division II and
III levels, the number of men's sports offered actually experienced a net
increase of 58 and 131, respectively. Only at the Division I-A and I-AAA
levels did the number of men's offerings experience a net decline. The largest
net decrease, interestingly, occurred in Division I-A.
TABLE

6

The Net Outcome of Men 's Sports Added and EliminatedDuring 1978 - 1996
by NCAA Division - Figure 2 89
NCAA
Division
I-A

NUMBER OF
SPORTS ADDED

NUMBER OF SPORTS
ELIMINATED

NET OUTCOME

22

113

-91

I-AA
I-AAA
II
III

68
93
344
400

TOTAL

927

129
56
286
269
853

-61
+37
+58
+131
+74

88. See Table 2, supra.
89. Women's Sports Foundation Study (Women's Sports Found., Nassau County, N.Y.), 1997, at
www.womenssportsfoundaton.org.
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Although the evidence appears to be counterintuitive, it follows the
economic model of budget allocation. Because the "marginal benefit" of a
dollar spent on football and men's basketball at the Division I (especially I-A)
level exceeds the marginal benefit of the same sports at Divisions II and III,
Division I athletic directors have an economic incentive to dedicate a greater
proportion of the budget to these sports. The evidence clearly supports this
contention. In fact, the largest allocation of resources in favor of football and
men's basketball occurs at the Division I-A level, where significant profits in
these sports serve as the norm.
If Division I athletic directors behave as profit-maximizers (or as "budgetmaximizers," whose budget increases and/or salaries are tied to the success of
the football and/or men's basketball teams), then any expenditure on a
nonrevenue sport will reduce the athletic department's profit. In time,
expenditures on nonrevenue sports would be reduced until the last dollar spent
on a nonrevenue sport serviced the investment/consumption interests of the
university as much as the last dollar spent on football and men's basketball (as
investment/consumption and profit-generating programs). If the athletic
director has significant autonomy in decision-making and does not stand to
benefit materially from the investment/consumption interests of the university,
the incentive is to phase out nonrevenue sports entirely.
In practice, the profit-maximizing athletic director cannot eliminate all
nonrevenue sports because of NCAA requirements.
Division I-A, for
example, will require a minimum of sixteen sponsored intercollegiate sports
beginning in 2004.90 Most of these, of course, will be nonrevenue sports.
Given the economic incentives of the profit-maximizing athletic director, one
would expect "surplus" nonrevenue sports to be cut or their budgets reduced in
favor of the income-generating sports.
In this regard, Title IX serves to insulate women's nonrevenue sports from
the budgetary axe. This is exhibited in the "expenditures per participant" data.
At the Division I level, the expenditures per football/men's basketball player
dwarf those of the other sports. 9 1 To allow for unbridled growth in their
budgets (driven primarily by the prisoner's dilemma), athletic directors resort
to exempting football and men's basketball from budgetary considerations and
92
cut men's nonrevenue sports as a means to comply with Title IX.
A questionnaire administered for a GAO study on intercollegiate athletics
found that gender equity ranked second as a reason to discontinue a men's

90. Division I Manual, supra note 53, at Art. 20.9.3.
91. See Table 3, supra.
92. See U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 1, at 16.
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sport. 93 This analysis reveals why the blame may be misplaced. As long as
football and men's basketball budgets are essentially exempted from
budgetary restraints, Title IX proportionality burdens are shifted to the
nonrevenue sports. This begs the question: is Title IX responsible for a sport's
discontinuation, or is it the incentive to favor the growth in the football/men's
basketball budget? In answering this question, we should note that the net
94
decrease in men's nonrevenue sports occurred only at the Division I level
despite the fact that football and men's basketball are frequently in a position
to cross-subsidize the nonrevenue sports. 9 5 At the Division III level, where
the expenditures per participant are substantially more equal between
"revenue" and nonrevenue sports, and also between men's and women's sports
97
in general, 96 the net change in the number of men's sports is positive.
If the analysis provided in this study is correct, weakening the
proportionality component of Title IX will not spare men's nonrevenue sports
at the Division I level. Rather, it will only serve to further accelerate the arms
race, with men's and women's nonrevenue sports experiencing equivalent
budgetary casualties.

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
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See
See
See
See

Table 6, supra.
Tables 2, 5, supra.
Table 3, supra.
Table 6, supra.

